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STANDING UP FOR INDUSTRY STANDING 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY 
CHALLENGES 
CHARLES H. HAAKE* 
RAYMOND B. LUDWISZEWSKI** 
Abstract: Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits courts to hearing only cases 
and controversies. To address this limitation, federal courts have developed the 
doctrine of standing, which requires a litigant to have suffered a cognizable injury 
in fact, which was caused by the challenged conduct and that will be redressable by 
a favorable outcome. Courts have struggled to balance these components and, in 
practice, different requirements have developed for meeting standing depending on 
the nature of the case and the type of party bringing suit. This Article explores the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s recent decisions in 
Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. 
EPA, and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. EPA. It argues that the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s findings in these cases—that industry petitioners lacked standing to sue—are 
the result of the court’s overly narrow analysis of EPA rulemakings as individual 
acts, without regard to the broader effect of the regulatory scheme of which the 
rulemakings are a part. In so doing, the D.C. Circuit has precluded industry peti-
tioners from accounting for the practical financial harms they have suffered. The 
authors conclude that the consequence of this narrow review is a higher bar to es-
tablish standing for industry petitioners than for environmental plaintiffs. Ultimate-
ly, the D.C. Circuit’s decisions raise the specter that a regulatory program that has 
tangible impacts on a regulated industry will nonetheless be shielded from judicial 
review. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal courts play a pivotal role in American governance, serving as a 
check on the actions of the legislative and executive branches. This check is par-
ticularly crucial with the rise of the administrative state, in which expert admin-
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istrative agencies are vested with the power to both craft and enforce rules that 
impact the day-to-day operations of American businesses.1 Although there is no 
official count of agencies within the executive branch of government, one source 
lists 137 separate federal agencies, one of which is the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA).2 The rules promulgated by all of the executive agencies 
and published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations currently occupy more 
space on the shelves of the Library of Congress than all of the current statutes 
enacted by Congress.3 When an administrative agency oversteps its bounds by 
taking an action that is either contrary to its congressional charter or is arbitrary 
and capricious, it is the role of the federal courts to rein in the agency.4 
Often, however, federal courts never reach the merits of an administrative 
challenge because they conclude that they lack jurisdiction to do so. Article III 
of the U.S. Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to “cases” and “contro-
versies.”5 One doctrine that has been developed by the federal courts to effectu-
ate this jurisdictional limitation is standing, which requires that a plaintiff seek-
ing to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction show that he or she has a real stake in 
the outcome of the litigation.6 The seminal Supreme Court case articulating the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (holding that Congress may vest broad 
power in agencies as long as it provides an “intelligible principle” to which the agency must conform); 
Kenneth Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (1986) (discuss-
ing the tension between the courts’ role of ensuring that agencies act according to statutory directives 
and the need to defer to agency expertise). 
 2 DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SOURCE-
BOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 15 (2012). 
 3 According to one researcher, the Code of Federal Regulations occupies 304.5 inches of shelf 
space in the Library of Congress, whereas the United States Code occupies only seventy-three inches 
of shelf space. See David Hayes, Are Federal Regulations Too Numerous? Has the Number of Them 
Multiplied Excessively? (2008), http://extent-of-regulation.dhwritings.com/, archived at http://perma.
cc/TS54-MJAY. 
 4 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (requiring that a reviewing 
court set aside agency actions, findings, or conclusions that the court finds to be “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”); see also Emily Hammond & David 
L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 321 (2013) (“A quick look at the standards of review set forth in [section] 
706 of the APA demonstrates this: courts ensure that agencies carry out their mandatory duties, follow 
proper procedures, engage in reasonable analyses, obey the Constitution, and act only within the con-
fines of their statutory mandates.”). 
 5 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 6 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (articulating the standing 
doctrine); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (holding the plaintiffs did not have standing 
where they asked the Court to restructure certain IRS tax schemes rather than seeking the enforcement 
of specific legal obligations); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (holding that a federal court 
may only hear a case where the plaintiff has suffered a “threatened or actual injury” that resulted from 
allegedly illegal activity); see also Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168–96 (1993) (providing a historical overview of 
the standing doctrine through the Lujan decision). 
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standing doctrine, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, arose in the context of an envi-
ronmental challenge.7 In that case, the Court held that the “irreducible constitu-
tional minimum of standing” consists of the following three components: (1) an 
“injury in fact,” i.e., an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete 
and particularized, and is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” 
(2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, i.e., 
the injury complained of must be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action 
of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some 
third party not before the court;” and (3) a showing that it is “likely,” as opposed 
to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable deci-
sion” of the court.8 
The Supreme Court has not precisely delineated what can and what cannot 
constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing, or just how likely it 
must be that an injury can be redressed by a court.9 Courts often struggle with 
this balance, as well as with the question of how much evidence, if any, a litigant 
must proffer in order to establish standing.10 In practice, different requirements 
for showing standing have arisen depending on the posture of the case, e.g., 
whether the litigant is being directly regulated by the EPA action in question or 
whether the party is seeking to protect an interest in a clean environment.11 
This Article discusses three recent decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit—Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. 
v. EPA,12 Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA,13 and Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers v. EPA14—that appear to have raised the standing bar for regulat-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See 504 U.S. at 556 (holding that environmental organizations lacked standing to challenge 
actions funded by the federal government in foreign countries that threaten endangered species be-
cause the organizations’ members could not show that they suffered injury-in-fact). 
 8 Id. at 560–61 (internal quotations omitted). 
 9 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (acknowledging that the components of standing, including injury in 
fact, are “not susceptible of precise definition”); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (rejecting the old “legal interest” test of standing; instead focusing the standing 
inquiry on whether the plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact”). 
 10 See infra notes 41–45 and 90–95 and accompanying text. See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 104–05 (1998) (holding that plaintiffs’ did not suffer a redressable 
injury due to a steel company’s failure to provide reports required by the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (expanding the 
category of redressable injuries beyond economic harms). 
 11 See infra notes 39–109 and accompanying text. 
 12 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), rev’d in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. 
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 13 693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 14 No. 11-1334, 2014 WL 5838463 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 21, 2014) (per curiam). These standing deci-
sions carry particular weight because of the D.C. Circuit’s central role in hearing challenges to regula-
tory actions and shaping administrative law. See Bradford Mank, Standing & Statistical Persons: A 
Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665, 696 (2009). “The D.C. Circuit’s standing 
test is important because the circuit has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction for many regulatory stat-
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ed industries challenging an EPA action, and that have strained the constitutional 
mooring on which the standing doctrine is based.15 
Part I of the Article outlines the constitutional bases for the standing doc-
trine and explains how it is rooted in the limitation of the federal courts’ jurisdic-
tion to cases and controversies.16 Part II goes on to describe how standing deci-
sions in environmental regulatory challenges generally entail an analysis as to 
whether the plaintiff falls into one of four broad categories: (1) regulated parties 
that are the object of the EPA action; (2) business interests that suffer a “com-
petitive injury” based on the impact of the action on their competitors; (3) envi-
ronmental special interest groups seeking to protect the environment; and (4) 
governments appearing as parens patriae17 to protect the environmental interests 
of their citizens and public lands.18 Part II also explains how courts have applied 
different burdens for establishing Article III standing depending on the category 
into which the particular plaintiff falls.19 
Part III discusses the background of the recent D.C. Circuit cases set forth 
above.20 It then explains that the difficulty industry petitioners faced in establish-
ing standing in those cases stemmed in part from the D.C. Circuit’s conducting a 
narrow assessment of each specific regulatory action before it, instead of taking 
into account how the action fit into a broader program that undeniably impacted 
the industry.21 This has seemingly allowed the EPA to strategically manage its 
rulemaking so as to defeat standing and thereby insulate from judicial review 
agency actions that strained the scope of its regulatory authority.22  
Part IV explains how the D.C. Circuit appears to be taking a more restric-
tive view of what constitutes a redressable injury-in-fact in challenges brought 
by industry groups than it is in challenges brought by environmental advocacy 
groups.23 Although courts have been open to environmental groups seeking to 
protect their members’ aesthetic interests in a clean environment, the D.C. Cir-
                                                                                                                           
utes and hears more regulatory cases than any other circuit.” Id.; see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 535 n.14 (1978) (“Since the vast majority of chal-
lenges to administrative agency action are brought to the [D.C. Circuit], the decision of that court . . . 
will serve as precedent for many more proceedings for judicial review of agency actions than would 
the decision of another Court of Appeals.”). 
 15 See infra notes 263–293 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
 17 Under the doctrine of parens patriae, a government has standing to bring a lawsuit on behalf of 
a citizen, particularly a citizen who is legally disabled from bringing the suit him-or-herself. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (10th ed. 2014). 
 18 See infra notes 36–109 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 36–109 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 110–262 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 151–227 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 257–262 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 263–294 and accompanying text. 
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cuit opinions discussed in this Article have required exacting evidence of con-
crete economic harm from the regulated industries.24 In doing so, the court re-
fused to entertain regulatory challenges brought by industry parties that had a 
significant stake in seeing the EPA action overturned and thus presented a live 
case and controversy between the industry parties and the EPA. Nonetheless, the 
court refused to fulfill its important role in checking the actions of the executive 
agency. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR STANDING 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution restricts the power of the federal courts 
to hear only “cases” and “controversies.”25 In 1792, in one of its earliest deci-
sions, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the “case” and “controversy” require-
ments of Article III prevented federal courts from issuing mere advisory opin-
ions where there was no actual dispute between the litigants, and it therefore re-
fused to offer President George Washington guidance as to how the Nation could 
lawfully maintain neutrality in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between 
England and France.26 
Since then, federal courts have established three interrelated doctrines to 
address this Article III limitation on their jurisdiction: standing; ripeness; and 
mootness. Standing under Article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an actual 
stake in the outcome of the litigation by showing an injury-in-fact, that such in-
jury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged action or inaction, and that 
the injury is one that could be redressed by a favorable decision from the court.27 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), 
rev’d in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Alliance of Automobile Mfrs. v. EPA, No. 11-1334, 2014 WL 
5838463 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 21, 2014) (per curiam). 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equi-
ty, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . . [and] to Controversies to which 
the United States shall be a Party . . . .”). 
 26 Letter from the Supreme Court to President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793) (on file with 
the National Archives), available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-13-02-
0263, archived at http://perma.cc/W4QM-46U8. 
 27 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
751 (1984). In addition to these Article III standing requirements, federal courts have also determined 
whether a litigant has “prudential standing,” i.e., that the interest the plaintiff seeks to protect is within 
the “zone of interests” to be protected or regulated by the statute in question. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 
F.3d at 179 (quoting Nat’l Petrochem. Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1147 (D.C. Cir.2002) 
(per curiam)). For example, federal courts have dismissed challenges under the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012), that have sought to vindicate purely eco-
nomic interests that are not related to the environmental interests NEPA aims to protect. See Ashley 
Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2005); Thompson Metal Fab, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Transp., 289 F.R.D. 637, 642 (D. Or. 2013). In Ashley Creek, the Ninth Circuit dismissed, for 
lack of prudential standing, a lawsuit challenging a phosphate mining project under NEPA because the 
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The ripeness doctrine prevents courts from entertaining a lawsuit too soon, that 
is, before the facts have developed to a point where a live controversy exists be-
tween the litigants.28 Mootness prevents courts from entertaining a lawsuit too 
late, that is, after the circumstances have developed to a point where there is no 
longer a live controversy between the litigants, even though there was one earlier 
in time.29 
Two of these constitutionally-based doctrines—ripeness and mootness—
were created by the courts to avoid being drawn into political or policy disputes 
before those controversies were fully developed or after the judiciary could af-
ford meaningful relief to the litigants.30 Standing also protects the Article III 
Branch in another way: by focusing on the parties and ensuring that they have 
adequate motivation to present the court with a comprehensive factual record 
and the best legal arguments supporting their respective positions.31  
At their cores, however, these three doctrines are nothing more than judi-
cially created standards designed to effectuate the case and controversy re-
                                                                                                                           
plaintiff’s only interest was that of a competing supplier of phosphate who stood to benefit if the pro-
ject did not go forward. 420 F.3d at 945. The court held that “[i]n light of the purpose of [section] 
102(2)(C) [of NEPA]—protection of the environment—and the specific statutory requirements for the 
content of an [environmental impact statement,] . . . a purely economic injury that is not intertwined 
with an environmental interest does not fall within [section] 102’s zone of interests.” Id. The doctrine 
of prudential standing is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be noted, however, that the moni-
ker “prudential standing” is in question after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., which found the term to be a “misnomer.” 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 
(2014) (quoting Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Sil-
berman, J., concurring)). Rather, a court should “determine, using traditional tools of statutory inter-
pretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim,” 
i.e., whether “this particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive statute.” Id. 
 28 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967). The basic rationale for the ripeness 
doctrine is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from becoming entan-
gled in abstract disagreements. Id. at 148. 
 29 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 (1974). In DeFunis v. Odegaard, the Supreme 
Court dismissed on mootness grounds the appeal of a student who had been denied admission to law 
school, but had then been provisionally admitted during the pendency of the case and was months 
away from graduating. Id. at 314, 320; see also Wildearth Guardians v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 690 
F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2012) (dismissing as moot an environmental group’s citizen suit against an 
energy company for building a new coal-fired power plant without a valid construction permit where 
the defendant finished construction of the plant while the suit was pending and the alleged violations 
could not reasonably be anticipated to recur). 
 30 See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 317; Abbot Labs., 387 U.S. at 148–49 (stating that the ripeness doc-
trine is meant to prevent courts from adjudicating “abstract disagreements,” and requires courts “to 
evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withhold-
ing court consideration”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241–42 (1937) (holding that 
a justiciable controversy must be definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract). 
 31 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (noting that the party invoking federal jurisdiction has the bur-
den of proving each element of standing). 
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strictions of Article III of the Constitution.32 They each stem from the “concern 
about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic soci-
ety.”33 This concern is especially acute in lawsuits challenging government ac-
tion or inaction, for entangling courts in such matters where there is no genuine 
case or controversy between the litigants “would significantly alter the allocation 
of power . . . away from a democratic form of government.”34 The standing doc-
trine reflects the fundamental jurisdictional limitation of federal courts by requir-
ing that “the plaintiff . . . ‘alleg[e] such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.”35 
II. APPLICATION OF THE STANDING DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATORY CHALLENGES 
In litigation challenging environmental regulatory actions, an assessment of 
the plaintiff’s standing generally falls into one of four categories: (1) individual 
entities—or their trade associations36—that are the object of the regulatory ac-
tion; (2) business interests that are not the direct object of the regulatory action 
but suffer a “competitive injury” based on the impact of the action on their com-
petitors; (3) individuals and environmental special interest groups seeking to 
protect or enhance the environment; and (4) governments appearing as parens 
patriae to protect the environmental interests of their citizens and public lands.37 
Although the constitutional underpinnings of the standing doctrine are the same 
no matter the context of the litigation, in practice courts have applied different 
burdens for establishing standing depending on the category under which the 
particular action falls.38 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See id. at 560 (observing that standing is an essential part of Article III’s case and controversy 
restrictions); Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (noting that the standing requirement “has a core component de-
rived directly from the Constitution”). 
 33 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudica-
tion: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365–66 (1973) (acknowledging that the three doctrines 
demonstrate a “strong ambivalence” about the role of judicial review in a democratic society). 
 34 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); see also 
Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3, (1964) (noting that the inability of federal courts “to re-
view moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exer-
cise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy”). 
 35 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
 36 Trade associations and public interest groups must also meet the test for “organizational stand-
ing,” which requires the organization to show that: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to 
sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; 
and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual 
members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
 37 See infra notes 39–109 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 39–109 and accompanying text. 
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A. Standing of Parties That Are the Object of Agency Action 
The standing of parties that are the object of the challenged agency action 
has been a relatively straightforward matter until recently. Where an administra-
tive agency effectively says to the regulated community “thou shalt do X,” or 
“thou art prohibited from doing Y,” standing to challenge that action has typical-
ly been presumed.39 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that in circum-
stances where the plaintiff is himself an object of the action or inaction at issue, 
“there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him inju-
ry, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”40 
On the injury-in-fact prong, the courts have generally accepted the costs as-
sociated with regulatory compliance as satisfying the constitutional minimum for 
standing.41 In most circumstances, the costs of a regulatory action or inaction 
will be evident from the administrative record because the industry “petitioner 
ordinarily will have participated in the proceedings before the agency.”42 Gener-
ally, therefore, when the industry is the direct target of the regulation under at-
tack, its claim to “standing to seek review of administrative action is self-
evident.”43 This presumption alleviates the burden of the regulated industry to 
aver facts establishing standing, for in contrast to the other types of challenges 
discussed herein, “no evidence outside the administrative record is necessary for 
the court to be sure of” standing in these circumstances.44 Consequently, ques-
tions of standing are often not even raised in regulatory challenges brought by 
parties that are the direct object of the regulation.45 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See generally Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 870 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that a 
group of cities had suffered injury in fact where complying with EPA water treatment regulations 
would be costly); City of Wausheka v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding the city had 
sufficient injury in fact because it would face substantial costs to comply with EPA drinking water 
regulations). 
 42 See Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 43 Id. at 899–90. 
 44 Id. at 890. The Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit provide 
that “[i]n cases involving direct review in this court of administrative actions, the brief of the appellant 
or petitioner must set forth the basis for the claim of standing.” D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(7). The Rules fur-
ther provide that “[w]hen the appellant’s or petitioner’s standing is not apparent from the administra-
tive record, the brief must include arguments and evidence establishing the claim of standing.” Id. 
(citing Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900–01). 
 45 See generally EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 
134 S. Ct. 1584 (2013) (noting the standing question was not raised in challenge brought by industry 
groups to EPA Cross-State Air Pollution Rule); New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(noting the standing question was not raised in challenge brought by electric utilities to a EPA rule 
regarding the emission of hazardous air pollutants from coal and oil-fired electric utility steam gener-
ating units). 
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B. Standing of Non-Regulated Parties to Assert Competitive Harm 
The judiciary has also acknowledged that a company or industry can suffer 
constitutionally cognizable injury-in-fact even if it is not the specific target of the 
challenged regulation. Courts have accepted indirect economic losses resulting 
from the impact of a regulatory action on others as sufficient to establish stand-
ing.46 The doctrine of competitor standing recognizes “that economic actors suf-
fer an injury-in-fact when agencies lift regulatory restrictions on their competi-
tors or otherwise allow increased competition against them.”47 A loosening of 
obligations on a competing entity or industry can create economic harm by en-
hancing their ability to compete and, thereby, damaging the enterprise value of 
the petitioner.48 Significantly, in contrast to challenges brought by entities that 
are the direct object of a regulatory action, standing in challenges alleging com-
petitive harm is generally not self-evident and must therefore be established by 
averring specific facts showing that all three standing prongs are satisfied.49 
In Honeywell International Inc. v. EPA, for example, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a manufacturer of an ap-
proved substitute for a particular ozone-depleting chemical had standing to chal-
lenge an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule authorizing the use of 
other substitutes.50 The court found that the petitioner had established an injury-
in-fact—lost sales of its product—and held that that injury was traceable to the 
EPA’s action “because the rule legalizes the entry of a product into a market in 
which Honeywell competes.”51 Redressability was established because “a favor-
able opinion of the court could remove the competing chemicals from the mar-
ket.”52 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that increased competition 
might injure a business); Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 141 
F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that plaintiff electricity provider suffered an injury-in-fact 
when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission allowed plaintiff’s competitor to sell electricity at 
more favorable rates). 
 47 Sherley, 610 F.3d at 72. 
 48 Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. EPA, 374 F.3d 1363, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Louisiana Energy & Pow-
er Auth., 141 F.3d at 367. 
 49 See, e.g., Honeywell, 374 F.3d at 1368–69 (discussing affidavit); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1497–99 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (requiring complaint to allege specific facts that 
show standing); see supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (laying out the three standing prongs). 
 50 374 F.3d at 1369. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 1369–70. 
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C. Standing of Advocacy Organizations Seeking to  
Protect the Environment 
Standing in the context of individuals and advocacy groups seeking to pro-
tect the environment traces back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit’s 1966 decision in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal 
Power Commission (Storm King).53 In the nearly five decades since Storm King, 
courts have struggled to strike a balance between limiting federal courts’ juris-
diction and allowing litigants their day in court.54 With Storm King, the judiciary 
began a string of rulings that would relax traditional standing requirements for 
environmental groups.55 Storm King marked the first time that a federal Court of 
Appeals held that an environmental group could satisfy standing based on their 
members’ “special interest in aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects” 
of the environment and that traditional economic harm was not essential.56  
The Supreme Court soon joined the Second Circuit in relaxing traditional 
injury-in-fact requirements for environmental interest groups.57 In Sierra Club v. 
Morton, the Court acknowledged that Article III standing could arise from injury 
to “scenery, natural and historical objects, and wildlife and . . . impair[ment] of 
the enjoyment of the [environment] for future generations.”58 The Court gave 
that injury-in-fact prong a similarly liberal interpretation in United States v. Stu-
dents Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).59 The Court found 
that Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (“SCRAP”)—an unin-
corporated association of five law students—had standing to challenge Interstate 
Commerce Commission orders authorizing a railroad rate increase on the 
transport of scrap materials because the students “used the forests, streams, 
mountains, and other resources in the Washington metropolitan area for camp-
ing, hiking, fishing, and sightseeing, and that this use was disturbed by the ad-
                                                                                                                           
 53 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Storm King Mountain 
stands along the west bank of the Hudson River. Id. at 611. Consolidated Edison planned to carve 
away part of the mountain adjoining the river and construct a pump storage hydro-electric plant with 
transmission lines across the river. Id. 
 54 See infra notes 55–109 and accompanying text. 
 55 See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183–84 (2000) 
(finding that interest group members had standing to sue because they demonstrated that their recrea-
tional, aesthetic, and economic interests in a waterway were affected by defendant’s pollutant dis-
charge); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 685 (1973) (holding that a group of law students had met the elements of standing by showing 
that their use of an outdoor area would be negatively affected by a rate increase on recyclable goods); 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (broadening the categories of injury that may be 
alleged to assert standing beyond economic harm). 
 56 354 F.2d at 616. 
 57 See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738. 
 58 Id. at 734. 
 59 See 412 U.S. at 685. 
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verse environmental impact caused by the nonuse of recyclable goods brought 
about by a rate increase on those commodities.”60 Although the Court recog-
nized that “many people suffer the same injury,” it still found the allegations of 
“a specific and perceptible harm” distinguished SCRAP members from the gen-
eral population.61 The Court expressed no concern over the chain of causation 
between a rate hike for the rail transport of scrap materials and increased envi-
ronmental degradation resulting from an assumed reduction in the use of recy-
cled goods.62 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court appeared to take a step back 
from the SCRAP ruling, and focused on the redressability prong of standing that 
was overlooked in SCRAP.63 In that case, the environmental group elected not to 
attack a particular project, but instead mounted a programmatic challenge to a 
government action—asserting that the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) re-
quired interagency consultation not only on domestic actions, but on federally 
funded international activities as well.64 The Court held that the petitioners had 
failed to establish the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” which 
requires three showings.65 First, the plaintiff must show an “‘injury in fact’—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized 
. . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”66 Second, 
“there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of 
the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third 
party not before the court.’”67 Finally, “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely 
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision’” of the 
court.68  
In Lujan, the Court found the connection between the plaintiffs’ alleged in-
jury—harm to a species overseas by an action funded by a federal agency that 
was not required to undertake interagency consultation under the ESA—and the 
available remedy—a remand requiring the ESA consultation regulations be ex-
tended to foreign activities—to be too remote to sustain standing.69 Writing for 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 687–89. 
 62 See id. at 685. Justice White, dissenting in this case, believed that the causation between the 
rate hike and increased environmental degradation should have been the plaintiffs’ downfall, stating 
that “the alleged injuries are so remote, speculative, and insubstantial in fact that they fail to confer 
standing.” Id. at 723 (White, J., dissenting). 
 63 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 64 Id. at 559. 
 65 Id. at 560. 
 66 Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)). 
 67 Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). 
 68 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). 
 69 Id. at 568–69. 
316 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:305 
the majority, Justice Scalia placed great weight on the fact that the federal actors 
who would actually fund the international projects that would harm the foreign 
species were not before the Court.70 The attenuated remedial chain, in combina-
tion with an independent actor—the funding agency—who was not a party to the 
litigation, was held to defeat redressability and thus deny standing.71 
Similarly, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court again 
found that an environmental group lacked standing.72 In that case, a steel plant’s 
neighbors sued concerning violations of the Emergency Planning and Communi-
ty Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”).73 The sole injury-in-fact claimed was purely 
informational—the plaintiffs wanted the reports required under the statute.74 The 
Court questioned whether informational injury alone could satisfy Article III 
injury-in-fact, but again based its ruling on redressability.75 As none of the spe-
cific items of relief sought—(a) a declaratory judgment that the facility violated 
EPCRA, (b) access to emission records, (c) injunctive relief allowing periodic 
inspections by the environmental group of the site, (d) copies of plant compli-
ance reports, (e) the payment of both civil penalties to the Treasury, and (f) the 
citizen group’s attorneys’ fees—would address the claimed injuries from late 
EPCRA reporting, the Supreme Court concluded that the environmental group’s 
harm could not be redressed by any order it had the power to issue.76 
With the turn of the century, the Supreme Court’s interest in the 1970s and 
1980s of using redressability to constrain the liberal environmental standing rul-
ings appeared to wane. This trend is exemplified by the Court’s decision in 
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., in which it 
found the plaintiffs had standing to protect their aesthetic, recreational, and eco-
nomic interests in a river.77 Although not a challenge to agency rulemaking, the 
Court demonstrated its sometimes lax requirements for standing in cases involv-
ing a public interest group acting as a citizen enforcer of a federal environmental 
law.78 The plaintiff members’ affidavits offered no evidence that the river had 
actually been injured by the defendant’s Clean Water Act permit violations, but 
the statements did claim that members who resided near the facility had curtailed 
swimming, fishing, and other recreational uses because of the potential effects of 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. at 569. 
 71 Id. at 568–69. 
 72 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998). 
 73 Id. at 86. 
 74 Id. at 104–05. 
 75 Id. at 105. 
 76 Id. at 105–06, 109–10. 
 77 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000). 
 78 See id. at 181–83 (finding that members’ affidavits describing their curtailed use of the North 
Tyger River due to defendant’s pollutant discharge into that river met the elements of standing). 
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the permit exceedences.79 For the Court—even in the absence of proof of actual 
environmental harm to the waterway—the voluntary constraint of outdoor activi-
ty adequately demonstrated injury-in-fact and standing.80 
The arc of Supreme Court environmental interest group standing jurispru-
dence—see-sawing from Morton and SCRAP to Lujan and Steel Co., and then 
back to Laidlaw—exposes a Court struggling to define the limits of the relaxed 
standing requirements it has afforded environmental plaintiffs.81 Thus far, the 
Court’s decisions appear to reveal a settled willingness to accept non-economic, 
recreational or aesthetic harms as sufficient to establish injury-in-fact.82 An epi-
sodic Court majority, however, remains convinced that Article III is not satisfied 
by member affidavits that are not tightly linked to the geographic location where 
the injury occurred and is troubled by redressability when the effectiveness of 
the available remedies depends upon the assumed actions of third parties.83 
One of the most recent D.C. Circuit cases to address the standing of envi-
ronmental organizations to challenge agency action, Sierra Club v. Jewell, 
demonstrates how the pendulum has swung back in the direction of permissive 
standing in such cases.84 There, environmental organizations brought an action 
challenging a decision removing the Blair Mountain Battlefield (the “Battle-
field”) from the Register of Historic Places (the “Register”), which the plaintiffs 
alleged would potentially open up the site to surface mining.85 A divided panel 
held that the plaintiffs had standing even though the land in question was pri-
vately owned and the organizations’ members therefore had no right to access 
it.86 The panel extended the type of cognizable aesthetic interest that confers 
standing to “observing the landscape from surrounding areas,” and “enjoying the 
Battlefield while on public roads.”87 Addressing the causation and redressability 
prongs, the panel rejected the finding of the district court that surface mining 
would take place even if the Battlefield were relisted because the restrictions on 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Id. at 182–83. 
 80 Id. at 183, 185–86. 
 81 See supra notes 57–80 and accompanying text (illustrating the inconsistent ideological ap-
proach to relaxed standing requirements for environmental plaintiffs). 
 82 See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 
669, 685 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972). 
 83 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495–96 (2009) (holding that environ-
mental organizations lacked standing to challenge U.S. Forest Service regulations exempting certain 
types of fire-rehabilitation activities and salvage-timber sales from the notice, comment, and appeal 
process, where the organizations did not offer any evidence concerning an actual or threatened Forest 
Service action that would harm any of their members). 
 84 See generally 764 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (aligning with the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Morton and SCRAP in the early 1970s by holding that harm to the plaintiffs’ interest in observing the 
landscape meets the injury-in-fact prong of standing). 
 85 Id. at 3–4. 
 86 Id. at 6. 
 87 Id. 
318 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:305 
mining on property listed in the Register contained an exception for permits with 
valid and existing rights.88 The panel noted that the extent to which this excep-
tion would limit mining activities on the property was open to interpretation, and 
so long as the plaintiffs offered a “non-frivolous contention” that its requested 
relief would redress its injuries, standing was satisfied.89 
Although the burden of proof for an environmental advocacy group to show 
standing may be relatively low, the burden of production can be demanding.90 In 
contrast to challenges brought by the regulated community where standing may 
be “self-evident,”91 a court will not simply presume that an environmental group 
or its members have standing to challenge an action of the EPA.92 Rather, “[t]he 
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these ele-
ments.”93 Generally, this showing is made through affidavits submitted by mem-
bers of the environmental group establishing “through specific facts” that they 
are among the parties injured by the government’s action or inaction.94 Moreo-
ver, given that the plaintiffs in such challenges are not the direct object of the 
government action or inaction being challenged, adducing evidence establishing 
harm, causation, and redressability “is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to 
establish” than it would be for a party that is the object of the action or inac-
tion.95 
D. Standing of State Governments Suing as Parens Patriae 
In the parens patriae context, the Supreme Court has recently recognized 
the special position of a sovereign protecting the interests of its citizens and its 
territory. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court addressed a challenge to the EPA’s 
decision not to regulate greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions from motor vehi-
cles.96 The Commonwealth asserted standing by claiming that rising ocean lev-
els associated with global warming endangered the Massachusetts shore and that 
the Commonwealth was losing coastal property to the rising sea levels.97 The 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. at 8. 
 89 Id. at 8–9. 
 90 See generally Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 169 
(2000) (granting standing to members of an environmental advocacy group who had presented affida-
vits documenting the different aesthetic and recreational harms they might suffer); Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (requiring plaintiffs to show, through affidavits or other specific 
facts, that they were directly affected by defendant’s conduct). 
 91 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 92 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 563. 
 95 Id. at 561–62. 
 96 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007). 
 97 Id. at 522. 
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EPA focused its standing attack on the “redressability” prong, arguing that even 
if there is a causal connection between man-made GHG emissions and global 
warming, any action by the EPA to limit GHG emissions from motor vehicles 
would have only an insignificant impact on Massachusetts’ purported injuries 
because any reductions achieved in domestic automobile emissions would be 
overwhelmed by anticipated increases in emissions occurring in other nations.98 
A majority of the Court rejected this argument.99 The Court found redressability 
satisfied so long as the desired remedy—GHG regulation of the U.S. automotive 
fleet—would contribute in some way to alleviating the petitioner’s alleged inju-
ry.100 
The Supreme Court cited to two bases for its relaxed approach to redressa-
bility in Massachusetts v. EPA: (1) the fact that Massachusetts was seeking to 
vindicate a “procedural right” accorded by Congress in the Clean Air Act, i.e., 
the right to challenge an agency action unlawfully withheld,101 and (2) the fact 
that Massachusetts was acting in a quasi-sovereign capacity.102 The majority 
stressed the “special position and interest of Massachusetts” as a sovereign State 
and not a private individual.103 Tracing precedent back ninety-nine years, the 
Court concluded “States are not normal litigants for invoking federal jurisdic-
tion” and, accordingly, granted “the Commonwealth . . . special solicitude in 
[the] standing analysis.”104 
After Massachusetts v. EPA, it can be assumed that a state acting as parens 
patriae will have a relatively easy hurdle to overcome in invoking federal juris-
diction and in satisfying the Supreme Court’s standing requirements.105 Given, 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id. at 523–24; see also COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING: MITIGATION, ADAPTION, AND THE SCIENCE BASE 5 
(1992), available at http://dge.stanford.edu/labs/caldeiralab/Caldeira%20downloads/Geoengineering_
NAS1992.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VT39-J34D. 
[G]reenhouse gases released anywhere in the world disperse rapidly in the global at-
mosphere. Neither the location of release nor the activity resulting in a release makes 
much difference. A molecule of CO2 from a cooking fire in Yellowstone or India is 
subject to the same laws of chemistry and physics in the atmosphere as a molecule from 
the exhaust pipe of a high-performance auto in Indiana or Europe. 
COMM. ON SCI., ENG’G, & PUB. POL’Y, supra, at 5. 
 99 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524–25. 
 100 Id. at 526. 
 101 Id. at 517; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012) (requiring a reviewing court to compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012) (allowing a party to petition for review of the 
promulgation of air quality or emissions standards). 
 102 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520. 
 103 Id. at 518. 
 104 Id. at 518, 520. 
 105 See id. at 520 (granting Massachusetts “special solicitude in the Court’s standing analysis 
given that the state was protecting its “quasi-sovereign interests”). 
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however, the heavy reliance of the Massachusetts v. EPA Court’s standing analy-
sis on the sovereign prerogatives that the State was seeking to vindicate and the 
majority’s pointed efforts to distinguish the State from private parties, there 
would be danger in extrapolating this approach to standing to cases brought only 
by industry trade associations or environmental groups.106  
Indeed, courts have refused to extend this relaxed standing test to private 
litigants also seeking to compel regulatory actions to reduce GHG emissions 
from industrial sources. In 2013, in Washington Environmental Council v. Bel-
lon, for instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an 
environmental advocacy group did not have standing to challenge the Washing-
ton State Department of Ecology’s decision not to require oil refineries to install 
control technology to limit GHG emissions.107 Despite alleging the same sort of 
harm and seeking the same sort of remedy as the State petitioners in Massachu-
setts v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs in Washington Environmen-
tal Council could not show a causal link between their “localized injuries and the 
greenhouse effect” given that “a multitude of independent third parties are re-
sponsible for the changes contributing to Plaintiffs’ injuries,” and because they 
could not show that the pollution controls they sought would have any impact 
alleviating their alleged injuries.108 The court distinguished Massachusetts v. 
EPA principally on the basis that “the present case [does not involve] a sovereign 
state,” and held that because the plaintiffs were private organizations, they “can-
not avail themselves of the ‘special solicitude’ extended to Massachusetts by the 
Supreme Court.”109 
III. RECENT CASES LIMITING STANDING FOR INDUSTRY PETITIONERS 
SEEKING TO CHALLENGE EPA REGULATORY ACTIONS 
Despite the general presumption discussed above that standing is self-
evident for entities that are the object of a regulatory program, three recent deci-
sions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—
Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA,110 Grocery Manufacturers 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See id.; Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citi-
zens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1704 
(2008) (arguing that although providing more lenient standing rights to states than to private individu-
als, the Court was unclear about when and to what extent states are entitled to easier standing). 
 107 732 F.3d 1131, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 108 Id. at 1143, 1144, 1146. 
 109 Id. at 1145; see also RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 146 (6th ed. 2009) (speculating that in future standing cases, 
Mass. v. EPA could be easily distinguished because it involved the “special solicitude” of a state pro-
tecting its quasi-sovereign interests). 
 110 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), rev’d in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. 
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
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Ass’n v. EPA,111 and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. EPA112—appear to 
have raised the standing bar for such litigants.113 These decisions were rendered 
in the context of two Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory pro-
grams: (1) EPA’s stationary source permitting program for GHG emissions;114 
and (2) EPA’s decision to allow the sale of gasoline containing up to fifteen per-
cent ethanol (“E15”) and its subsequent rule to prevent misfueling with E15.115 
Two observations arise from the courts’ holdings in these cases. First, the 
standing outcomes in the challenges to both of these programs stemmed in part 
from the courts’ narrow assessment of the specific regulatory actions before 
them—or, as one dissenting Judge put it, in an “isolation chamber”116—and not 
of how those actions fit into broader regulatory programs that, taken together, 
undeniably impacted the industry.117 Each program caused harm to the regulated 
entities when viewed in the broader regulatory context in which it operates.118 
But in order to make the programs feasible, the EPA was compelled to undertake 
ancillary actions that on their face served to ameliorate the burdens on the affect-
ed industries.119 Rather than focus on the regulatory programs as a whole when 
assessing whether the challenged rule caused a redressable harm to the regulated 
industries, the D.C. Circuit focused on each EPA decision separately.120 Based 
                                                                                                                           
 111 693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 112 No. 11-1334, 2014 WL 5838463 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 21, 2014) (per curiam). 
 113 See infra notes 263–294 and accompanying text. 
 114 See 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2012) (requiring a permit for all major stationary sources of air pollu-
tion); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 31,514, 31,514 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 
52, 70, 71) (tailoring the criteria for determining which stationary sources fall under the permitting 
requirements for greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions under the Clean Air Act). 
 115 Regulation to Mitigate the Misfueling of Vehicles and Engines with Gasoline Containing 
Greater Than Ten Volume Percent Ethanol and Modifications to the Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,406 (Jul. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Misfueling Mitigation Rule] (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80); Partial Grant and Partial Denial of Clean Air Act Waiver to Increase 
the Allowable Ethanol Content of Gasoline to 15 Percent, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,094, 68,095 (Nov. 4, 2010) 
[hereinafter E15 Partial Waiver] (notice). 
 116 Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 189 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 117 See id. at 178; Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam), rev’d in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). (find-
ing petitioners lacked standing because the EPA’s Timing and Tailoring Rules did not cause petition-
ers specific injury in fact). 
 118 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7475(o)(2) (providing a renewable fuel program that requires an 
increasing amount of renewable fuels be introduced to market every year between 2006 and 2022); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 80.1406 (2014) (naming petroleum refiners as obligated parties under the renewable fuel 
program), 80.1427 (requiring obligated parties to contribute to the increasing volume of renewable 
fuels). 
 119 See infra notes 144–150 and accompanying text. 
 120 See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 175–76 (rejecting plaintiffs alleged causal link between 
new fueling standards and potential liability the plaintiffs might incur due to consumers using the 
wrong fuel in engines manufactured by the plaintiffs); infra notes 151–227 and accompanying text. 
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on this isolated view, the D.C. Circuit held that the parties challenging the EPA 
action lacked standing because the individual actions before the court—when 
viewed in isolation—did not cause them harm.121 Significantly, the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s dismissals of these challenges on standing grounds were outcome-
determinative, as they shielded from review controversial EPA actions that stood 
on shaky legal grounds.  
The second observation is that through these opinions, the D.C. Circuit ap-
pears to be viewing industry standing with a much more skeptical eye than 
courts have in the past—more skeptical even than courts are currently assessing 
standing for environmental groups.122 In contrast to environmental groups, 
which can establish standing by showing that an agency action or inaction 
threatens its members aesthetic interests of enjoying the environment, industry 
groups are being required to offer specific and concrete evidence of direct eco-
nomic harm.123 Often, however, the impact of an EPA action to the regulated 
community goes beyond dollars and cents.124 Yet despite the fact that the peti-
tioners in such challenges seek to protect significant business interests, and 
therefore present a live controversy against the EPA, the D.C. Circuit has been 
reluctant to find standing.125 
A. The Challenge to the EPA’s Tailoring Rule in Coalition for  
Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA 
1. Legal and Regulatory Background of the Tailoring Rule and the EPA’s 
Stationary Source GHG Rulemaking 
In 2010, the EPA issued several rules that together required stationary 
sources of air pollution to obtain permits for their GHG emissions, with a princi-
ple focus on their carbon dioxide emissions.126 These rules were a result of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, which held that the EPA has 
the authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) and is 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 175–77. 
 122 Compare City of Wausheka v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding plaintiff city 
had shown injury in fact where it would face substantial costs to comply with EPA regulations), with 
Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 146 (finding that industry petitioners did not suffer 
injury by being subjected to the regulation of GHGs). 
 123 Compare Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000) 
(holding that members of environmental advocacy group had suffered sufficient injury to have stand-
ing where the members alleged aesthetic and recreational harms due to pollution of a river), with Alli-
ance of Auto. Mfrs. v. EPA, No. 11-1334, 2014 WL 5838463, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 21, 2014) (per 
curiam) (finding that industry petitioners lacked standing in part due the lack of specificity with which 
they alleged economic harms). 
 124 See infra notes 197–203 and accompanying text. 
 125 See supra notes 110–124 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 129–147 and accompanying text. 
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required to promulgate regulations limiting GHG emissions from new motor 
vehicles if the Agency were to make an “endangerment finding” under section 
202(a) of the Act.127 
That decision spurred a cascade of regulations targeting both mobile and 
stationary sources of GHG emissions.128 First, the EPA made an endangerment 
finding under section 202(a) (the “Endangerment Finding”), concluding that “el-
evated concentrations of [GHGs] in the atmosphere . . . endanger the public 
health and . . . welfare,” and that “emissions of . . . [GHGs] from new motor ve-
hicles contribute to [that] air pollution.”129 In light of that Endangerment Find-
ing, the EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration subse-
quently jointly issued the “Tailpipe Rule,” establishing fuel economy and GHG 
emission standards for light duty vehicles.130 
These actions put the EPA at a crossroad because the promulgation of the 
Tailpipe Rule arguably triggered stationary source GHG permitting requirements 
under the CAA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) program and 
Title V permitting program.131 The PSD program requires new and modified 
“major emitting facilit[ies]” to undergo permitting if the source or modification 
will result in an increase in air pollution.132 The statute defines “major emitting 
facility” as a stationary source that emits or has the potential to emit 250 tons per 
year (“tpy”) of “any air pollutant,” or 100-tpy of “any air pollutant” for statutori-
                                                                                                                           
 127 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007); see 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012). That section provides in relevant 
part: 
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any 
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle en-
gines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasona-
bly be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 
42 U.S.C.§ 7521(a). 
 128 See Charles Riordan, Comment, Barring the Gates: Timing and Tailoring Environmental 
Standing and Greenhouse Gas Regulation After Corri v. EPA, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 567, 
570–72 (2012). 
 129 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516, 66,537 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter the Endanger-
ment Finding] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I). 
 130 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Econ-
omy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) [hereinafter the Tailpipe Rule] (to be codified at 
49 C.F.R pts. 531, 533, 536–538). 
 131 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 
44,355 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I) (pointing out that “it has become 
clear that if EPA were to regulate [GHG] emissions from motor vehicles under the [CAA], then regu-
lation of smaller stationary sources that also emit GHGs—such as apartment buildings, large homes, 
schools, and hospitals—could also be triggered”). 
 132 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479 (2012). 
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ly enumerated industrial source categories.133 As a condition for obtaining a PSD 
permit, the Act requires that the facility must comply with emissions limitations 
reflecting the “best available control technology” (“BACT”) for “each pollutant 
subject to regulation under [the Act].”134 In a 1980 rulemaking construing the 
PSD provisions of the CAA, the EPA determined that all “major stationary 
sources” were subject to the PSD program, and defined “major stationary 
sources” as those that emit “any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act” 
in amounts above the statutory thresholds.135 Similarly, Title V requires an oper-
ating permit for any “major stationary source” that has the potential to emit at 
least 100-tpy of “any air pollutant.”136 
Applying these statutory thresholds to carbon dioxide created a dilemma 
for the EPA after Massachusetts v. EPA because unlike traditional air pollutants 
regulated by the EPA, such as sulfur dioxide and particulate matter, carbon diox-
ide is emitted in large quantities from many types of stationary sources.137 Thus, 
applying these statutory thresholds to carbon dioxide would sweep a myriad of 
sources into the PSD and Title V permitting programs for the first time and at a 
cost of billions of dollars.138 In fact, the EPA found that “[t]o apply the statutory 
PSD and [T]itle V applicability thresholds literally to sources of GHG emissions 
would bring tens of thousands of small sources and modifications into the PSD 
program each year, and millions of small sources into the [T]itle V program.”139 
These new sources could include hotels, hospitals, schools and churches—
entities that Congress did not intend to be subject to permitting under the 
CAA.140 
The EPA also found that the workload and cost of incorporating these new 
sources into the permitting programs would be substantial and potentially un-
workable, stating, “[t]he total additional workload, in work hours, for PSD per-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Id. § 7479(1). 
 134 Id. § 7475(a)(4). 
 135 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval 
and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,730 (Aug. 7, 1980) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 124). 
 136 42 U.S.C. §§ 7602(j), 7661a(a) (2012). 
 137 See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,535 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (noting that a reason the statutory thresholds would apply to so many additional 
sources is that many sources emit large quantities of carbon dioxide from generating heat or electrici-
ty); Clean Energy: Air Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/
energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last updated May 22, 2014), archived at http://perma.
cc/S5XY-FB5M (showing that fossil fuel-fired power plants account for seventy percent of sulfur 
dioxide emissions in the United States, but only forty percent of the country’s carbon dioxide emis-
sions). 
 138 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,536. 
 139 Id. at 31,533. 
 140 Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,375 
(proposed July 30, 2008). 
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mits would be more than 19.5 million more work hours, compared to 150,795 
work hours for the current PSD program, and the total additional costs would be 
over $1.5 billion, compared with $12 million for the current PSD program.”141 
Indeed, the EPA recognized that applying PSD and Title V permitting to carbon 
dioxide would be entirely contrary to the intent of Congress, which was to re-
quire only large industrial sources to be subject to permitting requirements.142 
The EPA therefore concluded that doing so would be an “absurd result.”143 
The EPA was therefore put to a choice: either reconsider its historical inter-
pretation of the scope of PSD and Title V, and instead construe those provisions 
such that they do not apply to carbon dioxide, or continue construing these pro-
visions as applying to all pollutants subject to regulation under the CAA, but 
ignore the Act’s unambiguous emissions thresholds.144 The EPA chose the latter 
course. In April 2010, it issued the so-called “Timing Rule” in which it deter-
mined that regulating vehicular GHG emissions under section 202 triggers PSD 
and Title V permitting requirements as of the date that the motor vehicle GHG 
regulations took effect (which in that case was January 2, 2011).145 In the EPA’s 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,557. 
 142 Id. at 31,555. The Tailoring Rule states, 
Congress’s mechanism for limiting PSD was the 100/250 tpy threshold limitations. Fo-
cused as it was primarily on NAAQS pollutants [i.e., pollutants regulated under the Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards], Congress considered sources that emit NAAQS 
pollutants in those quantities generally to be the large industrial sources to which it in-
tended PSD to be limited. 
Id. The preamble further notes that, 
It is not too much to say that applying PSD requirements literally to GHG sources at the 
present time—in the absence of streamlining or increasing permitting authority re-
sources and without tailoring the definition of “major emitting facility” or “modifica-
tion”—would result in a program that would have been unrecognizable to the Congress 
that designed PSD. Congress intended that PSD be limited to a relatively small number 
of large industrial sources. 
Id. 
 143 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,541 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
51, 52, 70, 71). 
 144 For example, opponents of the EPA’s rulemaking argued that the term “any air pollutant” 
should be read in the context of the PSD programs, which is to prevent areas of the country from 
backsliding with respect to compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”), 
and should therefore not include GHGs because they are not regulated under the NAAQS program. 
See, e.g., Comment of the Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG), Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0517-
5317, at 4, 23 n.9, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule 
Step 3, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,226 (proposed Mar. 8, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!
documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0517-5317, archived at http://perma.cc/E7GL-7CFV. As 
will be discussed in greater detail below, a version of this view was ultimately adopted by the Su-
preme Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 145 Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean 
Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter the Timing Rule]. 
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view, that determination provided a concession to the industry by delaying the 
applicability of PSD and Title V to GHG emissions until the Tailpipe Rule went 
into effect, as opposed to when it was finally promulgated.146 In order to address 
the “absurdity” of applying the CAA’s numeric thresholds to carbon dioxide 
emissions, the EPA subsequently issued the so-called “Tailoring Rule” in which 
the Agency decided to lower the thresholds for PSD and Title V such that per-
mitting would be required only for sources with the potential to emit at least 
100,000 tpy of carbon dioxide, and to require BACT where a source proposes to 
increase its emissions by at least 75,000-tpy of carbon dioxide.147 
The preambles to the Timing Rule and the Tailoring Rule show that the 
EPA was only able to make the resulting regulation workable, and thus subject 
stationary sources to GHG permitting, by relying on both rules. In the preamble 
to the April 2, 2010 Timing Rule, the EPA recognized “the substantial challenges 
associated with incorporating GHGs into the PSD program” and explained that 
“given the substantial magnitude of the PSD implementation challenges present-
ed by the regulation of GHGs, EPA proposed in the Tailoring Rule to at least 
temporarily limit the scope of GHG sources covered by the PSD program to en-
sure that permitting authorities can effectively implement it.”148 The EPA further 
explained that in light of the “significant administrative challenges presented by 
the application of the PSD and Title V requirements for GHGs “it was “neces-
sary to defer applying the PSD and Title V provisions for sources that are major 
based only on emissions of GHGs until a date that extends beyond January 2, 
2011.”149 In the Tailoring Rule, the EPA explained that “construing the PSD and 
title V requirements literally (as previously interpreted narrowly by EPA) would 
render it impossible for permitting authorities to administer the PSD provi-
sions.”150 
                                                                                                                           
 146 Id. at 17,006. 
 147 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. The EPA justified the Tailoring Rule on three doc-
trines of administrative law: (1) “absurd results,” which allows an agency to avoid the literal reading 
of a statute in order to avoid results that are plainly contrary to the intent of Congress; (2) “administra-
tive necessity,” which allows an agency to construe a statute in a manner that would make it possible 
for the agency to perform its functions; and (3) “one step at a time,” under which an agency may ad-
dress mandates through phased action. Id. at 31,541–42. 
 148 Timing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,020. 
 149 Id. at 17,007. 
 150 Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,542 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
51, 52, 70, 71). 
2015] Industry Standing in Environmental Regulatory Challenges 327 
2. The D.C. Circuit Dismissed Challenges to the Tailoring Rule on Standing 
Grounds and Upheld the Rest of the EPA’s Stationary Source GHG 
Permitting Program 
Several state coalitions, industry trade associations, and public interest 
groups challenged the EPA’s GHG rulemaking in the D.C. Circuit.151 These chal-
lenges raised three broad issues: (1) the scientific basis for the EPA’s Endanger-
ment Finding, (2) the legal bases for the Timing Rule and the Tailoring Rule, and 
(3) the EPA’s decision to promulgate motor-vehicle emission standards under 
section 202(a), despite the Agency’s conclusion that doing so would trigger cost-
ly stationary-source regulation.152 
In addition to supporting the merits of its rulemaking, the EPA argued that 
the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the Timing and the Tailoring rules 
because “neither the Timing Decision nor the Tailoring Rule caused the injury 
Petitioners allege: having to comply with PSD and Title V for emission of 
[GHGs].”153 Specifically, the EPA argued that “[w]ithout the Timing Decision, 
both State and Industry Petitioners would have been subject to PSD and Title V 
for [GHGs] at significantly earlier times than January 2, 2011” and “[w]ithout 
the Tailoring Rule, Industry will face PSD and Title V applicability for millions 
of additional sources and States will be required to permit all of these 
sources.”154 Strictly speaking, of course, these arguments were correct; viewed 
in isolation these decisions alleviated the industry’s burdens of the EPA’s deter-
mination that the CAA requires that GHG emissions be subject to PSD and Title 
V requirements.155 But, it was clear from the regulatory record that both of these 
rules were necessary prerequisites to the EPA’s stationary source GHG permit-
ting programs that, taken as a whole, indisputably caused injury to the regulated 
community.156 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), 
rev’d in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Final Brief for Respondents at 79, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d 102 (No. 10-
1073). 
 154 Id. 
 155 See id. 
 156 See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,557 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). The preamble to the Tailoring Rule states, 
We consider it difficult to overstate the impact that applying PSD requirements literally 
to GHG sources as of January 2, 2011—before streamlining or increasing permitting 
resources and without tailoring—would have on permitting authorities and on the PSD 
program, and we are concerned that this impact could adversely affect national econom-
ic development. The number of PSD permits that would be required from such an ap-
proach is far beyond what the PSD program has seen to date. It is clear throughout the 
country, PSD permit issuance would be unable to keep up with the flood of incoming 
applications, resulting in delays, at the outset, that would be at least a decade or longer, 
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In Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, a three-judge panel of the 
D.C. Circuit agreed with the EPA’s position on standing, and held that 
“[p]etitioners have failed to establish that the Timing and Tailoring Rules caused 
them ‘injury in fact,’ much less injury that could be redressed by the Rules’ vaca-
tur.”157 The court found that although “Industry Petitioners contend[ed] that they 
are injured because they are subject to regulation of [GHGs],” they lacked stand-
ing because “neither the Timing nor Tailoring Rules caused the injury Petitioners 
allege: having to comply with PSD and Title V for [GHGs].”158 To the contrary, 
the court found, 
[T]he Timing and Tailoring Rules actually mitigate Petitioners’ pur-
ported injuries. Without the Timing Rule, Petitioners may well have 
been subject to PSD and Title V for [GHGs] before January 2, 2011. 
Without the Tailoring Rule, an even greater number of industry and 
state-owned sources would be subject to PSD and Title V, and state 
authorities would be overwhelmed with millions of additional permit 
applications. Thus, Petitioners have failed to “show that, absent the 
government’s allegedly unlawful actions, there is a substantial proba-
bility that they would not be injured and that, if the court affords the 
relief requested, the injury will be removed.”159 
Having kept the Tailoring Rule intact on account of its standing decision, 
there was nothing preventing the court from upholding the EPA’s decision that 
PSD and Title V permitting were statutorily required once GHGs were subject to 
regulation under section 202(a) with respect to motor vehicles.160 The court 
agreed with the EPA’s position that its interpretation applying PSD and Title V 
permitting to all pollutants subject to regulation under the Act was “compelled” 
by the text of the statute.161 
The D.C. Circuit reached its conclusion despite its concession that “phrases 
like ‘any air pollutant’ are, in certain contexts, capable of a more limited mean-
ing.”162 The court nonetheless determined that the petitioners had “failed to iden-
tify any reasons that the phrase should be read narrowly here.”163 Of course, the 
                                                                                                                           
and that would only grow worse over time as each year, the number of new permit ap-
plications would exceed permitting authority resources for that year. 
Id. 
 157 Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam), 
rev’d in part sub nom. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
 160 See id. 
 161 Id. at 143–44. 
 162 Id. at 143. 
 163 Id. 
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EPA itself was offering the reason that the phrase “any air pollutant” should have 
been given a narrow reading in the PSD and Title V contexts: it would be impos-
sible to implement the programs applying a broad reading to include GHGs.164 
The D.C. Circuit, however, did not have to face the merits of this issue because it 
held that no party had standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule, which was the 
vehicle used by the EPA to alleviate the absurdity of its construction of the stat-
ute.165 
3. The U.S. Supreme Court Overturned the Tailoring Rule Without Directly 
Addressing the Standing Question and Struck Down Portions of the EPA’s 
Stationary Source GHG Permitting Program 
After the D.C. Circuit denied rehearing en banc, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari for Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, but limited the question to 
“[w]hether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of [GHG] emissions 
from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the CAA for 
stationary sources that emit [GHGs].”166 In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, 
a bare majority of the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the CAA 
“compelled” the EPA’s interpretation that PSD and Title V applied to GHGs 
once they were regulated under Title II, and in fact found that such a reading was 
not even permissible under the Act.167 Although the Supreme Court did not ex-
pressly overrule the D.C. Circuit’s decision on standing to challenge the Tailor-
ing Rule, the court understood how that rule was a necessary component of the 
EPA’s stationary source rulemaking, and therefore addressed it on the merits.168 
The Court recognized the “calamitous consequences” of applying PSD and Title 
V to GHGs,169 and how the EPA tried to use the Tailoring Rule to ameliorate 
those concerns: 
EPA thought that despite the foregoing problems, it could make its in-
terpretation [that the CAA compels stationary source permitting for 
GHG emissions once those substances are regulated anywhere under 
the Act] reasonable by adjusting the levels at which a source’s [GHG] 
emissions would oblige it to undergo PSD and Title V permitting. 
Although the Act, in no uncertain terms, requires permits for sources 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See supra notes 141–156 and accompanying text. 
 165 See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 146. The D.C. Circuit also upheld the other 
portions of the EPA’s GHG rulemaking, the Endangerment Finding and the Tailpipe Rule. Id. at 116–
29. 
 166 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2438 (2014). 
 167 Id. at 2439–43. 
 168 See id. at 2438, 2445. 
 169 Id. at 2442. 
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with the potential to emit more than 100 or 250 tons per year of a rel-
evant pollutant, EPA in its Tailoring Rule wrote a new threshold of 
100,000 tons per year for [GHGs]. Since the Court of Appeals thought 
the statute unambiguously made [GHGs] capable of triggering PSD 
and Title V, it held that petitioners lacked Article III standing to chal-
lenge the Tailoring Rule because that rule did not injure petitioners 
but merely relaxed the pre-existing statutory requirements. Because 
we, however, hold that EPA’s [GHG]-inclusive interpretation of the 
triggers was not compelled, and because EPA has essentially admitted 
that its interpretation would be unreasonable without “tailoring,” we 
consider the validity of the Tailoring Rule.170 
On the merits, the Court held that “EPA’s rewriting of the statutory thresh-
olds was impermissible and therefore could not validate the Agency’s interpreta-
tion of the triggering provisions.”171 An agency, the Court held, has “no power to 
‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statu-
tory terms.”172 Ultimately, the Court held, “[b]ecause the Tailoring Rule cannot 
save EPA’s interpretation of the triggers, that interpretation was impermissible 
under Chevron.”173 
Although the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision that no party had standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule, it is difficult 
not to read that decision as implicitly overruling that decision because the Court 
proceeded to the merits of that regulatory action.174 Once the Tailoring Rule was 
struck down, there was no pillar with which the EPA could support the rest of its 
regulatory program.175 The Supreme Court held that the EPA could not reasona-
bly read the CAA’s PSD and Title V provisions as applying to GHG emissions 
precisely because the Agency lacked the authority to “tailor” the statute to make 
such a regulatory program work in practice.176 It is clear that any successful 
challenge to the EPA’s stationary source GHG permitting program would have 
required the petitioners to also challenge the Tailoring Rule.177 Consequently, an 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Id. at 2444–45. 
 171 Id. at 2445. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 2446. The Court, however, upheld the EPA’s determination that BACT may apply to a 
stationary source’s GHG emissions if that source would otherwise have triggered PSD permitting on 
account of emissions of non-GHG pollutants. Id. at 2447–49. Here, the CAA’s provisions were not 
ambiguous: “To obtain a PSD permit, a source must be ‘subject to the best available control technolo-
gy’ for ‘each pollutant subject to regulation under [the Act]’ that it emits.” Id. at 2447 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012)). 
 174 See id. at 2447. 
 175 See id. at 2446. 
 176 See id. 
 177 See id. 
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assessment of whether the Tailoring Rule caused the regulated industry harm 
should not have been made in an “isolation chamber,” but rather in the broader 
context of the regulatory program.178 
B. Challenges to the EPA’s E15 Partial Waiver and the Misfueling  
Mitigation Rule in Grocery Manufacturers Association v. EPA  
and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. EPA 
1. Legal and Regulatory Background of the E15 Waiver and the Misfueling 
Mitigation Rule 
The EPA’s partial waiver to allow the sale of gasoline with E15, and its sub-
sequent rule to prevent misfueling with E15, present a very similar scenario to 
the legal challenge to the Tailoring Rule in which the D.C. Circuit viewed each 
rulemaking in an “isolation chamber” and found that the petitioners lacked 
standing.179 These actions stemmed from section 211 of the CAA, which out-
lines the EPA’s regulatory obligation with respect to transportation fuels.180 Sec-
tion 211(o) contains the CAA’s Renewable Fuel Standards (“RFS”) program.181 
The RFS program was created under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and estab-
lished mandates for the volume of renewable fuels that must be sold in the Unit-
ed States.182 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 increased the 
volume of renewable fuel required to be blended into transportation fuel from 9 
billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons by 2022.183 Ethanol derived from 
corn is a renewable fuel under the statute.184 Until recently, however, the amount 
of ethanol allowed in motor fuel was limited to ten percent (known as “E10”).185 
This volume restriction limited the total amount of ethanol that could be used to 
satisfy the RFS.186 
Consequently, ethanol producers petitioned the EPA to allow the sale of 
gasoline with up to fifteen percent ethanol (known as “E15”).187 This request 
                                                                                                                           
 178 See id.; Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 186, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). 
 179 See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 180, 189. 
 180 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2012). 
 181 Id. § 7545(o). 
 182 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1501–1520, 119 Stat. 594, 1067–92 
(2005). 
 183 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 202, 121 Stat. 1491, 
1521–22 (2007). 
 184 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(F). 
 185 E15 Partial Waiver, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,094, 68,095 (Nov. 4, 2010) (notice) (“Prior to today’s 
action, ethanol was limited to [ten percent by volume] in motor vehicle gasoline (E10).”). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
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implicated the fuel waiver provision found in section 211(f) of the CAA.188 The 
statute provides that no fuel or fuel additive may be introduced into commerce 
unless it is “substantially similar” to one already used in the certification of vehi-
cles or engines subject to federal emissions standards.189 The EPA may “waive” 
this restriction for a particular fuel or fuel additive if it finds that: 
[S]uch fuel or fuel additive or a specified concentration thereof, and 
the emission products of such fuel or fuel additive or specified con-
centration thereof, will not cause or contribute to a failure of any 
emission control device or system (over the useful life of the motor 
vehicle, motor vehicle engine, nonroad engine or nonroad vehicle in 
which such device or system is used) to achieve compliance by the 
vehicle or engine with the emission standards with respect to which it 
has been certified [pursuant to the Act].190 
In a decision published on November 4, 2010, the EPA took the unusual 
step of granting a “partial waiver” for E15, allowing it to be offered for sale for 
use in motor vehicles from model year (“MY”) 2007 and later.191 The Agency 
deferred a decision on whether to approve E15 for use in MY2001–2006 motor 
vehicles pending completion of studies by the Department of Energy.192 Subse-
quently, the EPA issued a second partial waiver allowing the use of E15 in 
MY2001–2006 light duty vehicles.193 Significantly, the EPA denied the waiver 
for MY2000 and older vehicles and for non-road engines and other vehicles be-
cause the Agency could not determine that the use of E15 in such vehicles and 
engines would not contribute to failures of emissions controls.194 The partial 
waiver decision was contingent upon the EPA finalizing a rule “mitigating the 
potential for misfueling of E15 in all vehicles, engines and equipment for which 
E15 is not approved,” which had been proposed at the time of the partial waiver 
decision.195 In July 2011, the EPA finalized its Misfueling Mitigation Rule, 
which prohibits the use of E15 in vehicles and engines for which it is not ap-
proved, requires a prescribed warning label on pumps dispensing E15, requires 
“product transfer documents specifying . . . ethanol content . . . [to] accompany 
the transfer of gasoline blended with ethanol through the fuel distribution sys-
                                                                                                                           
 188 Id. at 68,094. 
 189 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f)(1)(B) (2012). 
 190 Id. § 7545(f)(4) (alteration to original). 
 191 See E15 Partial Waiver, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,094, 68,095 (Nov. 4, 2010) (notice). 
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of Gasoline to 15 Percent, 76 Fed. Reg. 4662 (Jan. 26, 2011). 
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tem,” and requires “a survey of retail stations to ensure compliance with the re-
quirements for E15 labeling . . . .”196 
2. The D.C. Circuit Dismissed Challenges to the E15 Waiver and the 
Misfueling Mitigation Rule on Standing Grounds 
In Grocery Manufacturers and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, 
these EPA actions were each challenged by trade groups claiming that their 
members were harmed by the E15 regulatory program.197 The so-called “engine-
products group,” which consisted of trade associations representing manufactur-
ers of motor vehicles and non-road engines, challenged both the E15 Partial 
Waiver and the E15 Misfueling Mitigation Rule.198 The engine products group 
asserted that E15 causes damage to both pre-MY2000 and post-MY2000 motor 
vehicles and engines and to non-road engines, thus subjecting them to potential 
lawsuits, recalls, and reputational harm.199 For example, vehicle and engine 
manufacturers submitted studies suggesting that “allowing the use of E15 in mo-
tor vehicles could cause a substantial number of motor vehicles to fail emissions 
standards because of increased catalyst deterioration over the motor vehicles’ 
full useful life . . . .”200 Evidence was also submitted in the administrative record 
showing that increased concentrations of ethanol accelerates the corrosion of 
engine parts,201 and may pose “a significant safety hazard to operators of small 
non-road engines . . . .”202 The engine products group also challenged the Misfu-
eling Mitigation Rule, arguing that its measures were not sufficient to prevent 
misfueling and that a stronger and more detailed warning label should be re-
quired.203 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Misfueling Mitigation Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,406, 44,406 (Jul. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 80). The EPA also denied a petition for rulemaking to require retail stations to continue to 
offer E10 for sale. Id. 
 197 Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. V. EPA, No. 11-1334, 2014 WL 5838463, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 21, 
2014); Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 198 Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 2014 WL 5838463, at *1; Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 173. 
 199 Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 2014 WL 5838463, at *2; Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 175–76. 
 200 E15 Partial Waiver, 75 Fed. Reg. 68,094, 68,102 (Nov. 4, 2010) (notice). 
 201 Indeed, the EPA found that for MY2000 and older vehicles, E15 use “may result in degrada-
tion of metallic and non-metallic components in the fuel and evaporative emissions control systems 
that can lead to highly elevated hydrocarbon emissions from both vapor and liquid leaks” and that 
“[p]otential problems such as fuel pump corrosion or fuel hose swelling will likely be worse with E15 
than historically with E10, especially if motor vehicles operate exclusively on it.” Id. at 68,129. 
 202 Id. at 68,133. 
 203 See Joint Brief of Petitioners at 16–22, 27–31, Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., No. 11-1334, 2014 WL 
5838463. In fact the EPA tacitly recognized that a certain amount of misfueling would continue even 
with the implementation of the E15 Misfueling Mitigation Rule. See Misfueling Mitigation Rule, 76 
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A second group consisting of trade associations representing petroleum re-
finers and marketers (the so-called “petroleum group”) also challenged both the 
E15 Partial Waiver and the Misfueling Mitigation Rule.204 The petroleum group 
argued that refining, transporting, and storing E15 would increase their costs of 
doing business.205 For example, petroleum refiners and importers are obligated 
parties under the RFS, and therefore will be required to introduce E15 into 
commerce.206 Additionally, granting the partial waiver for E15 meant that there 
would be another gasoline-ethanol blend in the market in addition to E10, and 
petroleum marketers would be required to undertake special fuel production, 
transportation, and fuel segregation efforts to accommodate E15, all at additional 
costs to these parties.207 As to the Misfueling Mitigation Rule, the petroleum 
group pointed out that that rule imposed the costs and burdens of the labeling, 
transfer documentation, and compliance survey directly on its members.208 
A third group, which consisted of trade associations of food producers (the 
so-called “food group”), challenged the E15 Partial Waiver, but not the Misfuel-
ing Mitigation Rule.209 The food group claimed that allowing the increased use 
of ethanol for fuel enhanced the demand for (and hence the price of) corn.210 For 
instance, the EPA’s analyses showed that the incremental demand for corn etha-
nol resulting from the RFS would result in an 8.2% increase in the price of corn 
and a 10.3% increase in the price of soybeans.211 
In separate decisions issued just over two years apart, the D.C. Circuit held 
that none of the petitioners had standing to challenge either of these EPA ac-
tions.212 The remainder of this Part will focus on the Article III standing of the 
petroleum group and the engine products group in both of these decisions.213 In 
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each instance the D.C. Circuit—similar to its approach to the GHG Tailoring 
Rule—myopically considered just the rulemaking before it, without considering 
how that EPA action would impact the parties in the broader context of the EPA’s 
fuels program.214 In doing so, the court again did not address the merits of an 
EPA action that was based on an aggressive reading of the scope of the Agency’s 
statutory authority.215 
a. The Petroleum Group’s Standing in Grocery Manufacturers Association v. 
EPA and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. EPA 
In Grocery Manufacturers, the petroleum group presented evidence in the 
administrative record that the combination of the RFS and the E15 partial waiver 
would effectively compel its members to blend and market E15 and that doing 
so would subject them to increased operating costs like storage and transporta-
tion, among others.216 Nonetheless, the panel determined that the E15 Partial 
Waiver, standing alone, did not cause them any harm because it was not, strictly 
speaking, compulsory.217 The court concluded that it could not “fairly trace the 
petroleum group’s asserted injuries in fact—the new costs and liabilities of in-
troducing and dealing with E15—to the administrative action under review in 
this case” because it “does not force, require, or even encourage fuel manufac-
turers or any related entity to introduce the new fuel; it simply permits them to 
do so . . . .”218 
The panel rejected the petroleum group’s argument that the partial waiver 
combined with the RFS caused harm by effectively requiring the blending and 
marketing of E15.219 First, the court found that even if the RFS and the partial 
waiver compelled the blending and marketing of E15, it is the RFS and not the 
partial waiver that caused the injury.220 Alternatively, the court found that the 
petroleum group had “not established that refiners and importers will indeed 
have to introduce E15 to meet their volume requirements under the RFS” be-
cause the standard does not obligate the use of E15 to meet the volume require-
ments and because the CAA provides mechanisms by which the EPA can waive 
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the volume requirements.221 The panel also rejected the argument that the E15 
Partial Waiver would cause harm to downstream entities that are involved in the 
transfer, handling, and blending of E15.222 Again, the panel focused on the fact 
that the partial waiver is not a compulsory regulation but rather gives blenders 
and refiners a choice: 
Neither the RFS nor the partial E15 waivers “require” downstream 
entities to have anything to do with E15. If they face any pressure to 
handle E15, it is likely economic in nature. Downstream parties very 
well might lose business if they decline to blend or otherwise deal 
with E15, but that makes the choice to handle E15 one they make in 
their own self-interest, not one forced by any particular administrative 
action.223 
Judge Kavanaugh’s strongly worded dissent in Grocery Manufacturers dis-
agreed with the panel’s determination that the petroleum group lacked stand-
ing.224 Judge Kavanaugh conceded that “the E15 waiver alone does not require 
the petroleum group to use E15, make changes, and incur costs.”225 He pointed 
out, however, that the court “cannot consider the E15 waiver in some kind of 
isolation chamber,” and when viewed in in its broader context, “the combination 
of the renewable fuel mandate and the E15 waiver will force gasoline producers 
to produce E15.”226 Therefore, Judge Kavanaugh concluded, “the petroleum 
group’s injury is not self-imposed, but is directly caused by the agency action 
under review in this case.”227 
A separate panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded in Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers that the petroleum group also lacked standing to challenge the 
Misfueling Mitigation Rule.228 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact 
that the petroleum group’s members are the object of the regulations that would 
directly impose regulatory restrictions and costs on sellers of E15.229 The court 
found that standing was not self-evident because the petroleum group offered 
“no evidence that any of its members sells or plans to sell E15.”230 
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b. The Engine Products Group’s Standing in Grocery Manufacturers 
Association v. EPA and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. EPA 
The standing of the engine products group must be analyzed in the context 
of both the E15 Partial Waiver (which did not allow the use of E15 in pre-
MY2001 motor vehicles and non-road engines because it could cause harm to 
such engines) and the Misfueling Mitigation Rule (which was intended to pre-
vent the use of E15 in those engines in which it could cause harm).231 In both 
Grocery Manufacturers and Alliance of Automobile, the D.C. Circuit again de-
nied the industry standing without considering the interplay between these 
rules.232  
The engine products group supported its standing to challenge the E15 Par-
tial Waiver by citing to the administrative record, which shows that E15 can 
cause damage to both vehicles and engines for which it has been approved and 
for which it has not been approved, thus subjecting the manufacturers of such 
vehicles and engines to reputational harm and increased costs from warranty and 
safety-related claims.233 Indeed, the EPA effectively conceded that E15 could 
cause harm to older vehicles and non-road engines through its refusal to grant a 
waiver for the use of E15 in such vehicles and engines.234 The EPA also conced-
ed through the promulgation of the Misfueling Mitigation Rule that there is a 
substantial risk that consumers would either intentionally or unintentionally use 
E15 in vehicles and engines for which it has not been approved.235 Further, evi-
dence was presented in the rulemaking record that misfueling with an unap-
proved fuel is common, especially where the approved fuel is more expensive 
than the unapproved fuel.236 
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit found that the engine products group had 
failed to establish standing to challenge either the E15 Partial Waiver or the Mis-
fueling Mitigation Rule.237 The Grocery Manufacturers court held that “the en-
gine manufacturers provide almost no support for their assertion that E15 ‘may’ 
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damage the engines they have sold, subjecting them to liability.”238 This conclu-
sion, however, was at odds with the EPA’s decision not to grant a waiver for pre-
MY2001 vehicles or for non-road engines, and with the evidence discussed 
above concerning damage that E15 was found to cause such engines.239 The 
D.C. Circuit further held that any harm to the members of the engine products 
group from misfueling with E15 was “speculative” and dependent on the acts of 
third parties misfueling with E15.240 
In light of the evidence in the administrative record that E15 will cause 
damage to pre-MY2001 vehicles and non-road engines, and that the danger of 
misfueling is significant enough to warrant a separate EPA rule, the only way to 
rationalize the decision of the Grocery Manufactures court is in the context of 
the Misfueling Mitigation Rule.241 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit recognized the dan-
ger that vehicles and engines manufactured by the engine products group may be 
harmed through misfueling, and conceded that preventing misfueling was an 
important aspect of the EPA’s program.242 Referring to the then-pending Misfu-
eling Mitigation Rule, the court explained: 
The term “misfueling,” as used in the EPA decisions, refers to the use 
of E15 in pre-2001 vehicles and other non-approved vehicles, en-
gines, and equipment. The misfueling mitigation conditions and strat-
egies which EPA set forth as necessary for such a plan included 
pump-labeling requirements, participation in a pump-labeling and 
fuel-sample compliance survey, and proper documentation of ethanol 
content on transfer documents.243 
Consequently, just as the Tailoring Rule was a necessary prerequisite to the 
EPA’s stationary source [GHG] permitting program,244 an effective Misfueling 
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Mitigation Rule was a necessary prerequisite to a viable E15 Partial Waiver.245 
Without an effective Misfueling Mitigation Rule, the E15 Partial Waiver argua-
bly would have been illegal.246 As discussed above, section 211(f) of the CAA 
prevents the EPA from issuing a waiver for a new fuel unless it finds that the 
new fuel “will not cause or contribute to a failure of any emission control device 
or system . . . .”247 The EPA’s justification for the partial waiver was that this lim-
itation in section 211(f)(4) would be satisfied so long as the Misfueling Mitiga-
tion Rule effectively restricts the use of E15 to only vehicles in which it would 
not cause a failure of an emission control device or system.248 Thus, there could 
be no E15 Partial Waiver without the Misfueling Mitigation Rule and specifical-
ly, its intended effect of restricting E15 use in the aforementioned manner.249 
Nevertheless, a separate panel of the D.C. Circuit, in Alliance of Automo-
bile Manufacturers, held that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the 
Misfueling Mitigation Rule.250 Addressing the engine products group’s standing 
in a single short paragraph, the court concluded that the group “failed to offer 
evidence connecting sales of E15 under the regulation to injuries that EPG 
members are sufficiently likely to suffer so as to afford it standing.”251 But the 
evidence of the engine products group’s injuries was apparent from the record.252 
By the EPA’s own admission, E15 will cause harm when used in pre-MY2001 
vehicles and non-road engines, and the EPA promulgated the Misfueling Mitiga-
tion Rule for the specific purpose of preventing that harm.253 
It should be evident that manufacturers of vehicles and engines have a vest-
ed interest in ensuring that their products will not be harmed by a new fuel for 
which the engine has not been tested or certified.254 Therefore, the Misfueling 
Mitigation Rule caused injury to the industry in much the same way that the Tai-
loring Rule did: by providing the necessary legal foundation for a broader regu-
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latory program that caused harm to the industry.255 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit 
determined that the engine products group lacked standing to challenge either 
the E15 Partial Waiver or the Misfueling Mitigation Rule, in part because the 
court did not consider whether the waived fuel would cause damage in the ab-
sence of a Misfueling Mitigation Rule that would effectively prevent misfuel-
ing.256 
Moreover, just as was the case with the Tailoring Rule, the D.C. Circuit’s 
decisions that none of the petitioners had standing to challenge the E15 Partial 
Waiver and the Misfueling Mitigation Rule shielded from review an EPA action 
that was based on the Agency’s very aggressive reading of the statute.257 As 
Judge Kavanaugh noted in his dissent in Grocery Manufacturers, the merits of 
the E15 Partial Waiver “are not close” given that in “granting the E15 partial 
waiver, EPA ran roughshod over the relevant statutory limits.”258 According to 
the plain terms of section 211(f)’s waiver provisions, “in order to approve a 
waiver, EPA must find that the proposed new fuel will not cause any car model 
made after 1974 to fail emissions standards.”259 Despite this clear prohibition, 
“EPA issued a waiver for E15 even though it acknowledged that E15 likely 
would contribute to the failure of some cars made after 1974—namely, those 
made between 1975 and 2000—to achieve compliance with emissions stand-
ards.”260 Given these facts, Judge Kavanaugh concluded that “EPA’s E15 waiver 
thus plainly runs afoul of the statutory text” and that “EPA’s disregard of the 
statutory text is open and notorious.”261 Moreover, if the D.C. Circuit had over-
turned the Misfueling Mitigation Rule, then there would have been no legal 
foundation for the partial waiver, and presumably, the court would have been 
forced to vacate it.262 
IV. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S RECENT DECISIONS IMPOSE MORE EXACTING 
STANDING REQUIREMENTS ON INDUSTRY PETITIONERS THAN PUBLIC 
INTEREST GROUPS WHILE STRAYING FROM THE WELL-SETTLED  
GATE-KEEPING FUNCTION OF THE STANDING DOCTRINE 
These recent decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit appear to make it more difficult for industry petitioners to estab-
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lish standing in environmental challenges than it is for environmental advocacy 
groups, particularly when it comes to showing injury-in-fact.263 In doing so, the 
D.C. Circuit is taking standing far beyond its constitutional moorings, and is de-
clining to assert its jurisdiction over lawsuits where there is a live case and con-
troversy between litigants who have significant stakes in the outcome.264 Each of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions discussed above had some 
meaningful impacts on the industries challenging them.265 The Tailoring Rule 
was an integral component of the EPA’s greenhouse gas (“GHG”) permitting 
program for stationary sources and defined the scope of the sources that would 
be subject to those requirements.266 The E15 Partial Waiver virtually assured that 
blenders and refiners of motor fuel will have to produce and market fifteen per-
cent ethanol (“E15”) in order to meet the Renewable Fuel Standards (“RFS”) 
mandate, and created a substantial risk that vehicles and engines manufactured 
by the engine products group would be harmed when fueled with E15.267 And, 
the Misfueling Mitigation Rule directly imposed regulatory requirements on 
marketers of the fuel.268 As a result, industry groups vigorously opposed the 
EPA’s actions during the notice and comment period to the EPA rulemaking, and 
filed suit after the Agency finalized its actions.269 Despite these seemingly sub-
stantial impacts on affected industry parties, the D.C. Circuit in each instance 
found that the industry petitioners failed to show that they had suffered any cog-
nizable injury that could be redressed by a court decision in their favor.270 
These decisions stand in stark contrast to cases addressing the standing of 
environmental groups, which seem to set a very low bar for the types of harm 
that can confer standing to that demographic.271 This inconsistency was ex-
pressed in Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, 
where he observed: 
Under the majority opinion’s approach, it appears that a citizen who 
breathes air (or at least a citizen who has breathing problems) would 
have standing to challenge the E15 waiver. That’s because the E15 
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waiver will cause emissions that will negatively affect air quality. 
There is of course no such petitioner involved in this suit. But stand-
ing law protects economic interests as well as health interests. And the 
economic interests of the food and petroleum groups are palpably and 
significantly affected by the E15 waiver, just as are the health interests 
of citizens with breathing issues.272 
Of course, the types of interests that courts have found to be sufficient to 
confer standing for environmental groups go beyond human health.273 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that harm to “the mere esthetic interests of the 
plaintiff . . . will suffice” to establish the sort of concrete and particularized inju-
ry necessary to confer standing.274 Thus, for example, a plaintiff’s “enjoyment of 
flora or fauna,”275 or a “desire to use or observe an animal species,”276 or even a 
desire to simply not “observe offensive amounts of air pollution from the smoke-
stacks,”277 have all been found to be the sorts of interests protected by the stand-
ing doctrine. In Sierra Club v. Jewell, the D.C. Circuit went so far as to hold that 
observing from afar the scenic landscape of property one does not own and can-
not even lawfully enter is a cognizable interest, and a harm to that interest can 
confer standing.278 Presumably, courts have been so expansive concerning the 
types of harm that can confer standing in these cases because they have been 
satisfied that the petitioners alleging such harm had “such a personal stake in the 
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outcome of the controversy” that there was a live case or controversy for the 
court to adjudicate.279 
The same could—and should—be said of the interests that the industry pe-
titioners in the challenges to the Tailoring Rule and the E15 decisions were seek-
ing to protect.280 For example, the parties challenging the EPA’s stationary 
source GHG rulemaking correctly determined that the Tailoring Rule was a nec-
essary prerequisite to that program that indisputably caused them harm; without 
the Tailoring Rule, the EPA could not have promulgated that program given the 
absurd results that would have followed.281 The industry petitioners, therefore, 
had a stake in seeing that rule overturned, and there was a significant controver-
sy between the petitioners and the EPA concerning the Rule’s merits.282 As such, 
in its determination of the industry petitioners standing in the aforementioned 
cases, the D.C. Circuit should have assessed the entire GHG permitting program 
broadly to determine whether the Tailoring Rule caused the petitioners a con-
crete injury, thus satisfying the injury-in-fact prong of standing.283 
Similarly, the producers of motor vehicles and non-road engines had eco-
nomic and reputational interests in not allowing a fuel into the market that was 
shown to damage products they have manufactured, and thus subjecting them to 
the threat of recalls and product liability lawsuits and to reputational harm.284 In 
Grocery Manufacturers, however, the D.C. Circuit found that even if misfueling 
with E15 took place and damaged consumers’ vehicles and engines, “a theoreti-
cal possibility of lawsuits” without showing that such lawsuits would be “meri-
torious” is insufficient to show injury-in-fact.285 The court did not cite any au-
thority for this aspect of its holding, which would seemingly make it impossible 
to cite a threat of future lawsuits as a basis for harm; after all, a potential litigant 
is not going to admit in a court filing that a future lawsuit against it would be 
meritorious.286 If a member of an environmental organization has access to the 
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federal courts to protect a non-pecuniary interest such as being able to enjoy flo-
ra and fauna, then so too should a business be able to protect its non-pecuniary 
interests such as being able to operate in a regulatory environment that does not 
give rise to the threat of litigation.287 In light of the ideological basis for the 
granting environmental organizations standing based on the aforementioned 
harms, these harms should be sufficient to assure a court that it is being called 
upon to adjudicate a live controversy between industry petitioners and the EPA 
concerning the legality and technical merits of the Agency’s rules and programs. 
The D.C. Circuit’s opinions in Grocery Manufacturers and Alliance of Au-
tomobile Manufacturers could be read as holding merely that the petitioners had 
failed to offer evidence of their alleged injuries, as opposed to holding that the 
injuries alleged were insufficient to confer standing as a matter of law.288 Indeed, 
the majority in Grocery Manufacturers determined that because the E15 Partial 
Waiver does not “directly impose regulatory restrictions, costs, or other burdens 
on any of” the petitioners, standing in the case was “not self-evident,” thus sub-
jecting the petitioners to a heightened burden of production to show standing.289 
Similarly, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers court dismissed the chal-
lenge because the petroleum group “provide[d] no evidence that any of its mem-
bers sells or plans to sell E15,” and because the engine products group “failed to 
offer evidence connecting sales of E15 under the regulation to injuries that [en-
gine-products group] members are sufficiently likely to suffer so as to afford it 
standing.”290 But by requiring such extra-record evidence in the first place, the 
court erected barriers to standing that had not previously existed for industry 
petitioners challenging an EPA action that directly impacts them.291 Indeed, the 
court appears to have ignored its own prior cases holding that “no evidence out-
side the administrative record is necessary for the court to be sure of” standing 
where the regulated industry is challenging an agency action.292 In the case of 
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the Misfueling Mitigation Rule, for example, the EPA’s own analyses in the ad-
ministrative record estimated the total compliance cost to be borne by gasoline 
distributors to be $3.64 million per year.293 This by itself should have been suffi-
cient injury-in-fact to confer standing to challenge the rule.294 
CONCLUSION 
Industry petitioners do not lightly or without reason go through the expense 
of pursuing lawsuits seeking to overturn an action of a federal regulatory agency. 
Rather, they do so based upon a legitimate concern that the agency action will 
cause some harm to their business interests. The harm might be the increased 
costs resulting directly from having to comply with a regulatory program, or it 
might take a more subtle form, such as creating a heightened risk of lawsuits or 
compelling companies to choose not to sell certain products in order to avoid 
regulatory burdens. But whatever interests are being protected, there can be little 
question that a legitimate case and controversy exists between the industry par-
ties and the regulator concerning the legal and technical merits of the agency 
action. Federal courts should, in such instances, exercise the jurisdiction con-
ferred under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and entertain such challenges. 
The decisions of the D.C. Circuit in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, 
Inc. v. EPA, Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, and Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers v. EPA, however, raise the specter that a regulatory program that 
has tangible impacts on the regulated community will be shielded from judicial 
review. The legacy of these cases might be to teach agencies to fracture a com-
plex regulatory program into separate rulemakings, thereby insulating individual 
regulations—despite their combined effect—from legal challenges by the very 
parties most directly impacted. 
As seen in the cases of the EPA’s stationary source greenhouse gas permit-
ting program and the E15 Partial Waiver and Misfueling Mitigation Rule, a seg-
mented EPA action may not, standing alone, cause sufficient direct economic in-
jury to the regulated industries to establish standing. That does not mean, howev-
er, that the action does not cause harm when viewed in the broader context of the 
industries’ regulatory obligations. The U.S. Supreme Court apparently grasped 
this reality in its decision to overturn the Tailoring Rule in Utility Air Regulatory 
Group v. EPA, even though the Court did not directly address the standing of the 
parties to challenge that rule. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit, and other federal 
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courts considering whether to entertain regulatory challenges brought by regu-
lated parties, should be guided by the underlying acknowledgement of the prac-
tical harm caused to industry parties in Utility Air Regulatory Group, and in so 
doing, be more open to accepting the standing of industry petitioners. 
